The ambiguity of transparency
This book project asks whether or not stricter transparency requirements in international organizations have downsides, by pushing deliberations to more obscure venues. It hypothesizes that when new transparency regulations open negotiations up to public scrutiny, governments with an incentive for discretion will seek alternative venues that are potentially even more difficult to monitor. The argument is tested using the case of negotiations in the Council of the EU and the United Nations Security Council. I explore how greater transparency in the form of stricter transparency regulations and greater inclusivity increase informal meetings, often over meals. This project benefits from funding from the Hertie School of Governance, the LSE Covid fund, LSE STICERD, LSE’s European Institute, and Princeton University’s Liechtenstein Institute for Self-Determination. Preliminary findings featured on NRC Handelsblad. A first article on the EU Council can be found here.
People and International Politics in Post-War Europe (with Chris Anderson and Stephanie Hofmann)
What lessons do citizens draw from experiencing major armed conflicts, and how do they think about international politics in their immediate aftermath? When war is a recent rather than a distant memory, do people have coherent ideas about newly emerging tensions and the best ways to ensure peace, security, and stability going forward? While many politicians, pundits and observers point to lessons from World War 2 to illustrate the necessity of stopping aggressors decisively in their tracks, others maintain that the same event instead has shown that neutrality is the preferred way to prevent an escalation of armed conflict. How people arrive at vastly different assessments of events of regional and global significance is as notable as it is puzzling. This project aims to exploit a treasure trove of previously unused public surveys conducted on behalf of the U.S. Department of State in several European countries between 1945 until 1970. These surveys regularly asked random samples of citizens inter alia about their perceptions of the intensifying Cold War and their attitudes toward former warring parties, newly established international organizations, and European security projects. Together, well over 100,000 Europeans participated in these surveys, and they promise to offer rare glimpses into (changing) attitudes toward European and international politics in the years following World War 2. The project benefits from funds from the CIVICA consortium.
Taming of the shrews: Decentralized norm enforcement in the European Council (with Lucas Schramm)
The European Council is one of the European Union’s most dynamic decision-making bodies. Both scholars and practitioners attribute its effectiveness to an informal norm of diffuse reciprocity, which discourages governments from abusing their veto power. This paper explores why and how the European Council upholds this norm, despite frequent temptations to violate it and exploit its inherent ambiguity. Drawing on institutionalist literature on decentralized norm enforcement, we argue that governments maintain this norm by gathering information to identify violations and coordinating sanctions to ensure a unified front. Through two empirical case studies – focusing on British prime minister David Cameron and Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán – we investigate perceived attempts to exploit or withhold reciprocity in the European Council.